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Universal but not truly ‘global’:
governmentality, economic liberalism,
and the international
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Abstract. This article responds to issues raised about global governmentality studies by Jan
Selby, Jonathan Joseph, and David Chandler, especially regarding the implications of
‘scaling up’ a concept originally designed to describe the politics of advanced liberal societies
to the international realm. In response to these charges, I argue that critics have failed to
take full stock of Foucault’s contribution to the study of global liberalism, which owes
more to economic than political liberalism. Taking Foucault’s economic liberalism seriously,
that is, shifting the focus from questions of natural rights, legitimate rule, and territorial
security to matters of government, population management, and human betterment reveals
how liberalism operates as a universal, albeit not yet global, measure of truth, best illustrated
by the workings of global capital. While a lot more translation work (both empirical and
conceptual) is needed before governmentality can be convincingly extended to global politics,
Foucauldian approaches promise to add a historically rich and empirically grounded dimen-
sion to IR scholarship that should not be hampered by disciplinary admonitions.
Wanda Vrasti is Alexander von Humboldt Postdoctoral Fellow at the Humboldt University
in Berlin. She has written on (auto-)ethnography and IR research, the politics of travel, and
critical theory. Her dissertation entitled ‘The Self as Enterprise: Volunteer Tourism in the
Global South’ is currently under contract with the Intervention series at Routledge.
The work of Michel Foucault is by no means a novelty in International Relations
(IR). It was first popularised during the 1980s and 1990s when people like R. B. J.
Walker, Richard Ashley, Jim George, Spike Peterson, and Jens Bartelson began
revealing how many of the realpolitische staples of IR, like ‘anarchy’, ‘sovereignty’,
‘state’, and ‘power struggles’, not so much describe as produce (and police) our
understanding of what counts as global politics.1 These so-called ‘dissident’ scholars
were the first to use Foucault (but also Derrida, Agamben, Said, Spivak, Bhabha)
to denaturalise the disciplinarity of the field and critique its obsession with liberal-
Enlightenment traditions. More recently, however, a different Foucault has entered
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1 Jan Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault: Discourse, Liberal Governance and the Limits of Foucauldian IR’,
International Relations, 21:3 (2007), p. 326.
the discipline. Since the translation and publication of his latest Colle`ge de France
lectures, Society Must Be Defended, Security, Territory, Population and The Birth
of Biopolitics,2 Foucault’s reputation in IR has changed from that of a general
‘theoretical historian’,3 which questions and rearranges our traditional ways of
producing knowledge to that of a historian of the present, rewriting the rationality
of our contemporary condition. We have traded in the Foucault of discourse analysis
and the archivist of early modern disciplinary programmes for a thinker who does
not shy away from making a ‘foray in the field of contemporary history’.4 Especially
with Foucault’s much discussed return to questions of the state and sovereign power
in the later lectures,5 his writings seem to have a direct bearing upon the field of IR,
particularly for scholars looking to distance themselves from the statist ontology of
realist and liberal-institutional theories. I am referring here specifically to critical
(bio)security studies, which set out to identify the militaristic as well as molecular
strategies used to define ‘what life is and what it is for’, and the burgeoning subfield
of International Political Sociology (IPS) and to some extent also critical/cultural
International Political Economy (IPE), both of which are interested in how power
orders the more quotidian aspects of our lives.6 None of these approaches have
been spared criticism, which is why the present article seeks to clarify and unpack
some aspects of what has come to be known as the global governmentality debate.
In what follows, I review and respond to the three charges raised recently
against the usefulness of Foucault in International Relations by Jan Selby, David
Chandler, and Jonathan Joseph:7 (1) the argument that it is methodologically in-
appropriate to ‘scale up’ concepts which Foucault designed for the analysis of
individual and societal processes to the international sphere; (2) the critique that
Foucault’s theories of governmentality apply only to the Western world; in parts
of the world that lack the basic preconditions for liberalism, governmentality
‘reverts back to something more basic’ – what Foucault calls ‘disciplinary power’;8
and (3) finally, the idea that Foucauldian readings of the international exaggerate
both the unity and the naturalism of the global disregarding the continued impor-
tance of national interests, power struggles, violence and imperialism. Although
2 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975–1976 (New
York: Picador, 2003); Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de
France 1977–1978 (New York: Palgrave, 2007); Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures
at the Colle`ge de France 1978–1979 (Hampshire: Macmillan, 2008).
3 Andrew Neal, ‘Goodbye War on Terror? Foucault and Butler on Discourses of Law, War and
Exceptionalism’, in M. Dillon and A. Neal (eds), Foucault on Politics, Security and War (London:
Palgrave, 2008), p. 540.
4 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, dust jacket.
5 Stephen Collier, ‘Topologies of Power: Foucault’s Analysis of Political Government beyond ‘‘Govern-
mentality’’ ’, Theory, Culture & Society, 26:6 (2009), pp. 78–108.
6 Michael Merlingen, ‘Monster Studies’, International Political Sociology, 3:2 (2008), p. 273; Nicholas
J. Kiersey and Jason Weidner, ‘Editorial Introduction’, Global Society, 23:4 (2009), p. 354.
7 Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’; David Chandler, ‘Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism? The Limits of
the Biopolitical Approach’, International Political Sociology, 3:1 (2009), pp. 53–70; David Chandler,
‘Globalising Foucault: Turning Critique into Apologia – A Response to Kiersey and Rosenow’,
Global Society, 24:2 (2010), pp. 135–42; Jonathan Joseph, ‘Governmentality of What? Populations,
States and International Organizations’, Global Society, 23:4 (2009), pp. 413–27; Jonathan Joseph,
‘The Limits of Governmentality: Social Theory and the International’, in European Journal of
International Relations, 16:2 (2010a), pp. 223–46; Jonathan Joseph, ‘What Can Governmentality Do
for IR?’, International Political Sociology, 2:4 (2010b), pp. 202–4.
8 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, p. 225.
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these charges offer important correctives to Foucauldian applications in IR, they
fail to take full stock of Foucault’s contribution to the study of global liberalism,
which owes more to the economic liberalism of Hume, Smith, Ricardo, and James
and Stuart Mill but also German Ordoliberals and the Chicago school of economics
than to the political liberalism of Kant, Hobbes, and Rousseau dominant in much
IR.9 Taking Foucault’s economic liberalism seriously, that is, shifting the focus
from questions of natural rights, legitimate rule, and territorial security to matters
of government, population management, and human betterment will not only help
IR scholars transcend their proverbial statist ontology, it also promises to reveal
the material, cultural, and cognitive elements that allow liberalism to operate as
‘principally a civilizational project’10 with universal, albeit not yet global, reach.
The argument is structured in three parts. The first section reviews and responds
to critiques raised by Selby, Chandler, and Joseph. It shows how Foucault’s redefini-
tion of power and governmentality bypasses the binaries (inside/outside, domestic/
international, micro/macro-levels) and abstractions (state, sovereignty, the interna-
tional, global civil society) foundational to IR, and avoids many of the problems
the French thinker is usually charged with. The second section takes up the con-
ceptual confusion that lies at the heart of this debate between liberal and economic
liberalism. Closer attention to the latter demonstrates that liberalism harbours a
universal imagination despite the global being an uneven and fractured space, and
supports the case for global governmentality studies in International Relations. The
concluding section provides a brief overview of Foucault’s contributions to the
discipline, particularly for launching a more empirically grounded and politically
responsible research agenda, all the while keeping in mind that Foucault is better
used to interrogate our loyalty to disciplinary knowledge than to refurbish its
vestiges.
The limits of governmentality
Broadly speaking, governmentality refers to a philosophy of rule that started in the
sixteenth and culminated in the eighteenth century, eventually bringing about a
radical reorientation in the rationality and practice of Western politics. Intimately
tied to the history of liberalism, governmentality takes the population, as opposed
to the state, as the object and target of government and political economy as the
principle in the name of which government should be organised and eventually
limited. The raison d’eˆtre of modern government becomes less a matter of securing
the integrity and lawfulness of a territory than about ordering the economic and
political relations of the social to improve the welfare, health, and productivity
of the population.11 Different from the medieval rationality of power, where the
legitimacy of sovereign power derived from a cosmo-theological framework and
distinct from the raison d’e´tat logic where sovereignty was measured in terms of
9 Scott G. Nelson, Sovereignty and the Limits of the Liberal Imagination (New York: Routledge, 2009).
10 Mustapha Kamal Pasha, ‘In the Shadows of Globalization: Civilizational Crisis, the ‘‘Global Modern’’
and ‘‘Islamic Nihilism’’ ’, Globalizations, 7:1–2 (2010b), p. 180.
11 Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller (eds), The Foucault
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 87–104.
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territorial and material gain, the liberal doctrine defines government as the ability to
know, map, and affect the conduct of the body politic in its entire spatial dispersion.12
While early attempts to implement this new ‘art of government’13 sought to micro-
manage the conduct of the populace through disciplinary means, such as police and
mercantilist regulation, by the eighteenth century population growth and a complex
network of socio-economic affairs were making it increasingly difficult for centralised
power to know and manage the conduct of the entire populace. The liberal solution
was to have government delegate some of its original responsibilities to non-state
agencies of power, communities and even households and, with the help of bio-
power, ‘affect the way in which individuals conduct themselves’14 without violating
their rights and freedoms. Liberal theory, being at the same time a political model
for legitimate rule and individual freedom, and an economic theory of free market
relations, introduced a fundamental tension between the multiplicity of economic
subjects and the totalising logic of sovereign power. To resolve or, at least, relax this
tension sovereign power had to operate ‘at a distance’ – it had to sacrifice its unitary
and prohibitive style of rule for less hierarchical and more subtle technologies.15
Traces of this logic are visible even today when the job of governmentality is to
extend a flexible entrepreneurial ethos across the entire social field in order to
maintain the steering capacity of the state more or less intact. To govern, then, for
Foucault, is not to rule over others, but ‘to structure the possible field of action of
others’ in ways congruent with the disciplinary injunctions of juridical power yet
not fully dependent upon its direct intervention.16
There are three distinct charges brought against this redefinition of government
and its applications in international studies. The most basic one, raised by Jan
Selby, argues that Foucault’s approach to power is too microscopic (it is concerned
mostly with societal processes and individuation practices) to tell us anything signi-
ficant about the macro-level processes International Relations is interested in.17 ‘A
theorist whose focus was primarily the ‘‘domestic’’ social arena’ cannot be used to
12 This is not to say that governmentality is separate from or subsequent to sovereign power and
its reliance on law, consensus and force, but rather a reconfiguration of sovereign power: they exist
side by side, circulating in and out of each other. As John Protevi explains in ‘What Does Foucault
Think is New About Neo-Liberalism?’, John Protevi’s website {http://www.protevi.com/john/
Foucault_28June2009.pdf } (accessed 28 June 2009) the present moment consists of a succession of
various rationalities of government: the medieval ‘cosmo-theological framework’, where the responsi-
bility of the sovereign is to guarantee the salvation of the people by acting in accordance to natural,
cosmic and divine law; seventeenth-eighteenth century raison d’e´tat, where the prince has to secure
the growth and survival of the state through various means of discipline, such as police, mercantilist
regulation and inter-state stability; nineteenth century physiocracy and classic liberalism, which
introduce political economy as a science to both limit the power of government and ensure the
growth and prosperity of the population; and, finally, twentieth century neoliberalism, where the
state intervenes in the social fabric to secure the smooth functioning of an artificial and fragile
market. This progression must not be understood in the strict, linear sense. The present rationality
of government is in many ways a principle for developing, perfecting, and strengthening moments
past, in Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, p. 29.
13 Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, p. 97.
14 Graham Burchell, ‘Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self ’, in A. Barry, T. Osborne and N.
Rose (eds), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Govern-
ment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 20.
15 John Protevi, ‘What Does Foucault Think is New About Neo-Liberalism?’
16 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, in J. D. Faubion (ed.), Michel Foucault: Power. Essential Works
of Foucault 1954–1984 (New York: The New Press, 2001), p. 341.
17 Mathias Albert and Peter Lenco, ‘Introduction to the Forum – Foucault and International Political
Sociology’, International Political Sociology, 2:3 (2008), p. 256.
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study the international because there is an ‘ontological gulf ’ between the two.18
While it is correct that Foucault showed little interest for the state system or inter-
state relations, the level of analysis problem raised by Selby says more about IR’s
own ontological purism than about the impossibility of using Foucault for the
study of global politics.
Foucault’s regicidal ambitions represent a heretic affront to the juridico-institutional
concept of power used in political science, economics, and history.19 Instead of focus-
ing on the ‘who’ of power (Who can exercise it and against whom? What legitimises
power? What principles define the threshold of that legitimacy?), like IR does,
Foucault preferred to study the way in which power is exercised in action. He was
interested neither in domestic nor in international politics, neither in liberal nor in
developing states. He plainly refused to accept sovereign power as the tacit common
sense that informs all of these hierarchical distinctions:20 ‘The analysis of power
relations within a society cannot be reduced to the study of a series of institutions or
even to the study of all those institutions that would merit the name ‘‘political’’ ’.21
‘Power, in the substantive sense, ‘‘le pouvoir’’ doesn’t exist’,22 Foucault famously
declared, it only gains temporal permanence and spatial corporeality through human
(inter)action.
Foucault encourages us to trace the organisation and circulation of power
through the entire social field rather than start our analysis from a priori objects
like states, nations, or institutions. This much more empirical and grounded method
will, at times, lead us to institutions, policy programmes, and diplomatic agreements,
other times, it will point to scientific discoveries, architectural designs, and other
more mundane and inconspicuous practices. Either way, power cannot be reduced
to the classic terms of social theory (systems, structures, and apparatuses). Neither
can it be localised at the micro-, meso-, or macro-level because these sites are not
‘in and of [themselves] necessarily real’23 so much as conceptual categories meant to
help IR (as well as other disciplines) guard its conceptual territory (states, nations,
institutions, policies, civil society, etc.) and epistemic security.24 As such, we need
not shy away from abandoning these heuristic devices should the erratic and elusive
‘economy’ of power relations take us into different directions. Perhaps leaving the
master-category of the sovereign state aside for a moment could help us finally
overcome the common tendency to view the national and the global as two separate
and mutually exclusive sites tied in a zero-sum game. We could then move towards
combining international and domestic politics, military, and parliamentary processes,
international security and political economy or address questions of sociality and
18 Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’, pp. 325, 332; Joseph, ‘Governmentality of What’, p. 414.
19 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, p. 327.
20 R. B. J. Walker, After the Globe, Before the World (New York: Routledge, 2009); Mustapaha Kamal
Pasha, ‘Disciplining Foucault’, International Political Sociology, 2:4 (2010a), pp. 213–15.
21 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, p. 344.
22 Michel Foucault, ‘The Confession of the Flesh’, in C. Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected
Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 198.
23 Nicholas J. Kiersey, Jason R. Weidner, and Doerthe Rosenow, ‘Response to Chandler’, Global Society,
24:2 (2010), p. 146, emphasis in original.
24 R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993); J. Marshall Beier, International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity,
Cosmology and the Limits of International Theory (New York: Palgrave, 2005).
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subjectivity in ways that are more attuned to the complex political realities we
inhabit.25 This is a topic I shall have more to say about in the conclusion.
A much more serious charge argues that Foucault’s notion of governmentality
does not apply to developed and developing countries alike. Because Foucauldian
scholars have focused too heavily on the general operation of governmental tech-
niques and not sufficiently on the specific conditions that make governmentality
work in some instances and not others, governmentality studies suggest a universal
constant that is too global or complete to permit empirical investigation.26 Using
a ‘Marxist social ontology’,27 Selby and Joseph remind us that the strategies
and technologies of liberal government are ‘much more unevenly distributed’ than
global governmentality studies would suggest.28 Joseph rightfully explains that
‘[t]he uneven nature of the international means that techniques developed in one
part of the world may unsuccessfully be applied in a different part of the world.
Unevenness also suggests that states coexist in hierarchical power relations’,29
which makes certain states susceptible to foreign intervention or influence, be it
in the form of IMF structural adjustments plans, ‘good governance’ campaigns,
development programmes, humanitarian interventions, or the global war on drugs,
poverty, and terror. In parts of the world that lack the social basis and stable
institutions necessary to develop a liberal programme of their own, governmentality
applies neither as an explanatory theory nor as a political practice.30 It fails or
‘reverts back to something more basic’ – what Foucault calls ‘disciplinary power’
or imperialism.31 Governmentality ‘applies to these cases only insofar as it does
not apply, in which case concepts like ‘‘contragovernmentality’’ should provide an
explanation of why this should be the case’.32
The concept of governmentality does not necessarily bring anything new to an analysis of
lawlessness in Sierra Leone, the displacement of populations by war or the role of guerilla
movements and village chiefs.33
[C]an the idea that power is exercised over ‘free’ subjects really be applied to Afghanistan?
Do we find in sub-Saharan Africa the exercise of power through free and autonomous indi-
viduals? Can the rationality and ethos of liberalism really be applied to the Middle East?34
Joseph proposes two solutions to this problem. Either we say that governmen-
tality ‘applies to places like the EU, but not to places like sub-Saharan Africa’, in
25 Saskia Sassen, ‘Territory and Territoriality in the Global Economy’, International Sociology, 15:2 (2000),
pp. 372–93; We find this duality both in International Relations, where a split between domestic politics
(as open to democracy, liberty, and prosperity) and international affairs (as inherently belligerent and
uncertain) sustains the fiction of sovereign power, as shown by R. B. J. Walker in Inside/Outside, and
in Globalisation Studies, where the state is viewed as a precarious entity constantly threatened by
accelerating global processes.
26 Stephen Collier, ‘Topologies of Power: Foucault’s Analysis of Political Government beyond ‘‘Govern-
mentality’’ ’, Theory, Culture & Society, 26:6 (2009), p. 97; Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’;
Chandler, ‘Globalising Foucault’.
27 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, p. 225.
28 Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’, p. 339; Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, p. 225.
29 Joseph, ‘Governmentality of What?’, p. 427.
30 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, pp. 237–8; Joseph, ‘What Can Governmentality Do for
IR?’, p. 203.
31 Joseph, ‘Governmentality of What’, p. 427; Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, p. 225.
32 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, p. 236.
33 Ibid., p. 236.
34 Ibid., p. 242.
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which case the concept is limited spatially. Or we say that the EU can be govern-
mentalised much easier than sub-Saharan Africa where the socioeconomic and
institutional conditions present a greater challenge, in which case we need to look
at the state forms and capabilities that determine when and how governmentality
is effective.35 Either way, what is needed is a much more empirically rigorous
investigation of the conditions and structures under which the management of
populations and states becomes effective. If we omit the structural, historical, and
institutional conditions that make governmentality possible in certain locales but
not others, the concept risks being generalised or exaggerated beyond the point of
explanatory utility.36
Foucauldian scholars in IR are very much aware of this danger. They know
that we do not inhabit a smooth and homogenous global space and that we must
be careful not to overstate the effects of global governmentality or the term may
become misleading and vacuous.37 Still, we have very little grasp of ‘just how variable
across the world bio-political administrative systems really are (or how much the
practices of government and the constitution of subjects differ between, say, New
York and New Guinea), or even more important, of why these differences exist’.38
In part this can be attributed to the fact that Foucauldian approaches ‘have a
tendency to focus much on the mentality aspect’, on discursive rationalities, pro-
grammes, and technologies of power rather than on their material foundations.39
There is a long-standing tradition in Foucauldian studies to treat governmentality
as a form of thinking or mentalite´ about how to make social reality knowable and
manageable.40 Another reason is that, so far, governmentality studies, whether deal-
ing with security, insurance, accounting, crime, health, or international affairs (the
European Union, international organisations, global civil society), have tended to
focus preponderantly on ‘successful’ cases rather than obstacles to governmentalisa-
tion. The assumption here is that the governed are already docile or enthusiastic
enough to conform to the regulatory injunctions of liberal rule.41 As such, Joseph’s
call for greater conceptual and empirical specification of ‘where governmentality
can be applied [and] . . . what sort of governmentality is being applied’42 should be
taken seriously if only to pre-empt reified images of global power, on the one hand,
and premature celebrations of global community, on the other.
35 Ibid., p. 239.
36 Chandler, ‘Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism?’, p. 97; Jonathan Joseph, ‘What Can Governmentality
Do for IR?’, International Political Sociology, 2:4 (2010b), p. 203; Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmen-
tality’, p. 241.
37 Larner and Williams, ‘Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces’, in W. Larner and
W. Walters (eds), Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces (New York: Routledge,
2004), p. 5.
38 Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’, p. 336.
39 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, p. 241.
40 Collier, ‘Topologies of Power’, p. 96; see Colin Gordon, ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduc-
tion’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 1–52; Nikolas Rose, ‘Governing ‘‘Advanced’’
Liberal Democracies’, in A. Barry, T. Osborne, and N. Rose (eds), Foucault and Political Reason:
Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press),
pp. 37–64; Thomas Lemke, ‘ ‘‘The Birth of Bio-Politics’’: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the College
de France on Neo-liberal Governmentality’, Economy and Society, 3:2 (2001), pp. 190–207.
41 Merlingen, ‘Monster Studies’, p. 190f.
42 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, p. 235.
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[D]o not try and make [governmentality] do too much. Distinguish clearly how it works.
Explain its limits and how it intersects with other processes . . . [E]xplain how governmen-
tality connects with sovereignty and disciplinary power and how governmentality is to be
distinguished from the more general working of biopower.43
What is more, Joseph’s intervention dovetails nicely with calls made in other disci-
plines to ground the otherwise disembodied and agent-less grammar of governmen-
tality in empirical research. In anthropology44 and sociology,45 for instance, the
preferred solution has been to advocate for ethnographic inquiries into the micro-
politics of everyday life. Where I part ways with Joseph is his limited understanding
of how global liberalism functions.
Liberalism can indeed distinguish between the management of advanced liberal
and peripheral nations. Governance through freedom might apply in one case,
while imperial tactics may be required in another. Just because Foucault cut off
the king’s head does not mean that liberal rule is carried out only by cultivating
the ‘habits of self-governance’.46 It can also take the form of naked police, military
intervention, sanctions, and coercion.47 Where Joseph errs is to downplay the rela-
tion between imperial intervention and liberalism, when it has been clearly demon-
strated that the primary goal of the former is to ‘extend European rule and social
institutions to the rest of the world’ and produce ‘market democracies’ strongly
indebted and embedded in liberal ideals of development and modernisation.48
This project of ‘liberal ordering’ has discursive, institutional, and coercive mani-
festations. It makes use of less conspicuous self-government or laissez-faire tactics
as well as more overt strategies like military intervention. The task of global govern-
mentality scholarship, which many have already assumed,49 is not to draw a map of
all the places where liberalism works and those where it does not, as Joseph’s statist
ontology demands, but rather to show how the various strategies of liberal rule,
while they may occupy different points on the sovereignty-discipline-government
continuum,50 are assembled together into what Foucault called a ‘system of cor-
relation’.51 The fact that many global politics students still equate liberalism with
liberal democracy and refuse to recognise the links between liberalism, global capi-
talism, and imperialism, has a lot to do with the state-centric models of explanation
that continue to dominate the discipline. When we fix state, society, and territory
into a sovereign model we empty the explanatory power of the social conditions
and political processes that allow states to exist but which also transcend and/or
transform the state container. What is an even greater cause for concern, however,
is that Selby and Joseph’s Marxist orientation does not correct this blindfold. Any
43 Joseph, ‘What Can Governmentality Do for IR?’, p. 203.
44 Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1999), pp. 3–4; Collier, ‘Topologies of Power’, pp. 98–100.
45 Nikolas Rose, ‘Power in Therapy: Techne and Ethos’, Academy for the Study of the Psychoanalytic
Arts, available at: {http://www.academyanalyticarts.org/rose2.htm}.
46 Nicholas J. Kiersey, ‘World State or Global Governmentality? Constitutive Power and Resistance in
a Post-Imperial World’, Global Change, Peace & Society, 20:3 (2008), p. 370.
47 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, ‘The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization’,
European Journal of International Relations, 5:4 (1999), pp. 421–2.
48 Ibid., p. 421.
49 Ong, Flexible Citizenship; Larner and Walters, ‘Global Governmentality’; Walters and Haahr,
‘Governmentality and Political Studies’; Stephen Collier and Aihwa Ong (eds), Global Assemblages:
Technology, Politics and Ethics as Anthropological Problems (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005).
50 Joseph, ‘Governmentality of What’, p. 416.
51 Collier, ‘Topologies of Power’, p. 89.
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Marxist should know that capitalism has always used illiberal means (slavery, colo-
nialism, land-grabs, and other more contemporary forms of accumulation by dispos-
session) to justify liberal ends of civilising, modernising, and bettering its others.52
Imperialism and liberalism have never been far off from each other despite the latter’s
rhetorical commitment to democracy and justice. Joseph and Selby, however, ignore
this historical evidence, which leads me to believe that their ‘Marxist social ontology’53
is more of a statist ontology in disguise than a distinct political conviction. If Marxists
usually take issue with post-structural theory for glossing over capitalist violence,
objective class interests and political utopia,54 Joseph and Selby’s invoke structural
inequality not out of some Marxist purism, but to justify IR business as usual and
make sure Foucauldian approaches ‘abide by rules of disciplinary utility’.55 Talk of
global ‘unevenness’, in this context, only helps reinforce the idea of a world made
up of discreet territorial units, each with its own clear geopolitical interests, strategic
positions, and material strengths and weaknesses, but does nothing to contribute to
an explicitly Marxist political vision.
A final point of critique argues that Foucauldian scholars exaggerate the triumph
of liberalism neglecting, on the one hand, the continued persistence of inter-state
anarchy and competition in international affairs56 and, on the other, the crisis
of political representation that plagues the liberal project on a domestic level.57
According to both Joseph and Chandler, scholarship that transcends state-based
governance does not accurately capture or outright ignores global political realities,
hence making for a liberal turn in IR theory. ‘Scaling up’ Foucault overstates the
unity and the naturalism of the global, robbing us of a conceptual vocabulary to
deal with national decision-making processes, structural inequalities, and historical
conditions.
For Joseph the issue with global governmentality and its emphasis on liberalism is
that it suggests a smooth functioning, consensus-based international order:
The ironic danger of over-applying the concept of governmentality to IR is to reinforce the
ideological claim that we live in a liberal international order. Given that governmentality is
intimately connected to liberalism (or, in today’s specific form, neoliberalism), IR theories of
governmentality tend to take for granted the spread of (neo)liberalism through international
institutions. In reality we have suggested that the international order is far from liberal
and far from being liberalized, despite the best of efforts of neoliberals to speak or act as
if it were.58
Rather than focus on instances of cooperation, rule-making, and network action,
governmentality scholars would be better advised to study the contexts in which
the liberal ideal cannot be realised because of certain unlawful, illiberal, or violent
52 Couze Venn, ‘Neoliberal Political Economy, Biopolitics and Colonialism: A Transcolonial Genealogy of
Inequality’, Theory, Culture & Society, 26:6 (2009), pp. 206–33; Agathangelou, ‘Bodies of Desire’;
Pasha, ‘In the Shadows of Globalization’.
53 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, p. 225.
54 See Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Daniel
McGee, ‘Post-Marxism: The Opiate of the Intellectuals’, Modern Language Quarterly, 58:2 (1997),
pp. 201–25; Timothy Brennan, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes’, Critical Inquiry, 29 (2005), pp. 337–67.
55 Francois Debrix, ‘We Other IR Foucauldians’, International Political Sociology, 2:4 (2010), p. 197.
56 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, p. 230.
57 Chandler, ‘Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism?’; Chandler, ‘Globalizing Foucault’.
58 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, p. 242.
Universal but not truly ‘global’ 57
states as well as the general competitive and hierarchical nature of world politics.
For Chandler, the weakness of the liberal internationalist dream come from else-
where, not from the inherently anarchic character of International Relations, but
from the failures of national politics. Contemporary Foucauldian approaches,
Chandler argues, assume we live in a global (post-national, post-sovereign) order
marked by the ever-expanding forcefulness of the liberal way of rule, when in fact
liberalism is clearly losing ground. Late modernity has brought on a crisis of political
representation which caused many people to retreat from political life and become
apathetic, hyper-individualistic creatures. Levels of political participation are at an
all-time low, making it impossible for national governments to forge a shared sense
of political destiny.59 The ‘hollowing out’ of territorial politics renders the liberal
project, especially on a global level, more improbable, not more potent as global
governmentality scholars like to suggest.60 Our task, as IR scholars, should be to
solve the liberal crisis of representation, not to exacerbate it by shifting power
from the national to the global level, thus letting the nation-state and its citizenry
become little more than handmaidens of free-floating global forces.61
The implication here seems to be that Foucauldian scholars suffer from the
same naivite´ idealists and cosmopolitans did before them: (global) liberalism may
be desirable, only political reality is far too brutal and uncertain to allow this dream
to become reality. But this is where the critics are mistaken: when Foucaudians in-
voke ‘liberalism’ it is always as a critique, never as an aspiration.62 Global liberalism,
Foucauldians and other feminist, post-colonial and Marxian scholars argue, is
not about less wars and more democratic states, as liberal peace theory suggests,
but requires more foreign interventions, greater surveillance, and more intimate
technologies of discipline and punish. Global liberalism represents a general loss in
human autonomy and self-determination especially in the case of the Global South
where liberalism can only succeed through a blatant violation of indigenous forms
of life and knowledge. We are dealing here with a conceptual confusion (or maybe
even a political disagreement) about the meaning of liberalism: while the nature of
political liberalism, with its emphasis on rights, representation, and legitimacy, may
be under attack (some might argue that the ‘anxiety about the groundlessness of all
politics, all forms of community’ is foundational to the liberal-Enlightenment tradi-
tion),63 what makes the world go round, global governmentality scholars argue, is a
different type of liberalism – one inspired by neoliberal economic principles.64 This is
a form of liberalism which, despite not having a global reach, harbours a universal
ambition.
Foucault’s liberalism
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of liberalism: a liberalism consumed with
the origins and legitimacy of power, what we now call ‘political liberalism’, and
59 Chandler, ‘Globalising Foucault’.
60 Chandler, ‘Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism?’
61 Kiersey et al., ‘Response to Chandler’, p. 144.
62 Foucault’s own political view of liberalism is more complicated. The next section discusses this in
greater detail.
63 Nelson, Sovereignty and the Limits of the Liberal Imagination, p. 102.
64 Nicholas J. Kiersey, ‘Neoliberal Political Economy and the Subjectivity of Crisis: Governmentality is
Not Hollow’, Global Society, 23:4 (2009), p. 363.
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an ‘economic liberalism’ which takes the existence of government as given and is
more preoccupied with procedural and administrative considerations. While liberals
like Kant, Hobbes, and Rousseau are more concerned with establishing the legiti-
macy of power by setting up a correspondence between law and popular will, the
state and the people, sovereignty and subjectivity, economic liberals like Hume,
Smith, Ricardo, and James and Stuart Mill are more interested in how to limit power
to increase the utility of personal and societal affairs. ‘Because economic liberalism
attaches no special importance to the question of power’s origin (unlike the revolu-
tionary or natural-rights tradition), it effectively dispenses with the need for juridical
foundations’65 to devote more attention to the ways in which power can be mobilised
(and limited) for the ‘betterment of the population’.66 For economic liberalism there
can be no better internal limitation to sovereign power and guide to human better-
ment than the market. Seen as a naturally given, automatically functioning meeting
ground for people to satisfy their interests and resolve their passions, the market
becomes the principle in the name of which government should be organised and
assessed.67 As Scott Nelson recently observed, in International Relations the liberal
imagination is limited to the former school of thought. The liberal Enlightenment
tradition wilfully ignores the writings of classic political economists or banishes
them to the subfield of International Political Economy,68 thus solidifying the
notion that political power has virtually remained static since the Westphalian
moment.69 Foucault’s concept of governmentality challenges this view.
Governmentality, it is important to remember, is not just a concept Foucault
invented to cut off the king’s head. While the term did help Foucault dispense
with juridical, purely territorial models of power in favour of a more temporal
process concerned with the management and ordering of social life, its significance
reaches well beyond Foucault’s own research agenda. Governmentality is also
shorthand for the historical transformation of modern power from the Middle
Ages to the present, from sovereign rule to disciplinary power and, finally, to
biopolitics. Beginning with the eighteenth century the concern of power changed
to ‘redirect the energies of government from the control of territorial sovereignty
to the management of populations and things’.70 The ambition was less to ‘insur[e]
the obedience of citizen-subjects and the security of a territory [than to effect] the
correct disposition, administration and distribution of things’, populations and
subjectivities.71 Governmentality, then, becomes a statement about the shift in
liberalism over the past couple of centuries from a political project concerned
with the order, stability and peacefulness of a territorially bounded polity to an
economic regime of power that designates the market as the measure of effective
government and social improvement. The two are not entirely divorced. The political
principles of liberalism (individual rights, rule of law, and liberty of expression)
65 Michael C. Behrent, ‘Liberalism without Humanism: Michel Foucault and the Free-Market Creed,
1976–1979’, Modern Intellectual History, 6:3 (2009), p. 562.
66 Nelson, Sovereignty and the Limits of the Liberal Imagination, p. 109.
67 Tiziana Terranova, ‘Another Life. The Nature of Political Economy in Foucault’s Genealogy of
Biopolitics’, Theory, Culture & Society, 26:6 (2009), p. 237.
68 See David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, Savage Economics: Wealth, Poverty and the Temporal
Walls of Capitalism (New York: Routledge, 2010).
69 Nelson, Sovereignty and the Limits of the Liberal Imagination, p. 103.
70 Ibid., p. 104, emphasis in original.
71 Ibid., p. 105, emphasis in original.
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remain necessary for a functioning market economy organised around private prop-
erty, competition, and entrepreneurship. Still, political economy becomes the guid-
ing principle of modern government. If some voices in the discipline take issue with
the conceptual and methodological applications of governmentality, the historical
evidence is much harder to refute, especially after Foucault devoted two lecture
series to tracing the genealogical roots of economic liberalism and showing this to
be the paradigmatic mode for governing the present.
In The Birth of Biopolitics Foucault focused on the latest incarnation of this
development: neoliberalism. He defined it as a style of government developed
in the 1930s by German Ordoliberal economists and later on modified by the
Chicago school of economics that takes the market as the guiding principle for all
human action. Having suffered the repercussions of laissez-faire economic policies,
post-war Ordoliberals and American neoliberals were hesitant to let the market
function freely, steered only by individual interests and passions. This so-called
‘naı¨ve naturalism’ was said to have been responsible for the economic failure of
the Weimar Republic and the subsequent rise of Nazi Germany. For the market
to act as the organising principle for both state and society, an ambition which
was integral to post-war reconstruction efforts, the market had to be carefully
orchestrated and embedded in appropriate forms of policy and sociality. This is
not to say that government should correct the destructive effects of the market, as
recommended by Keynesian politics. More accurately, government should intervene
in society to produce the types of subjects and social relations a market economy
needs.72 This is what Foucault referred to as biopolitics and the German Ordoliberals
before him called Gesellschaftspolitik (societal politics): a type of power that inter-
venes in the lives of the population to promote social and moral orders conducive
to entrepreneurial conduct, create a society that can thrive with only limited govern-
ment intervention, and disseminate the necessary rights and freedoms for individuals
to give their lives an entrepreneurial shape. No wonder, then, that Foucault con-
sidered subjectivity to be the primordial locus of government. For governmentality
to be effective it had to first be affective:73 it had to cultivate certain modes of
conduct, dispositions, and values that would allow government to function smoothly
with the voluntary, even enthusiastic participation of the population.
In his typical non-normative, anti-humanist fashion Foucault refrained from
making any overt judgments about the desirability or the dangers of neoliberalism
in his work. It was up to his epigones to take a critical stance to economic liberal-
ism mainly because they lived to see the destructive effects neoliberalism has
when taken to its full conclusion. Neoliberalism did not remain fixed in the benign
formulation of Ordoliberals. When it crossed the Atlantic it was modified by the
Reagan, Thatcher, and Pinochet regimes and, then, a generation later, by third
way democrats like Clinton, Blair, and Schro¨der to introduce privatisation, de-
regulation, and wide-spread precarisation. This is why Foucauldians in sociology,74
72 Foucault, The Birth the Biopolitics, pp. 117–20.
73 I borrow the phrase from William Mazzarella, ‘Affect: What Is It Good For?’, in Saurabh Dube
(ed.), Enchantments of Modernity: Empire, Nation, Globalization (London: Routledge), p. 299.
74 Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmen-
tality (University of Chicago Press, 1991); Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose (eds),
Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996).
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political theory,75 and a host of other disciplines76 have adopted a critical view of
economic liberalism, especially of the governmental techniques and strategies used
to bring our social lives and individual conduct in line with market logics in such
subtle, almost benevolent ways that it renders resistance futile. Some even went
so far as to use Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and biopower to launch
Marxian critiques of global capital and empire.77 Even in international studies there
are global governmentality scholars who have found Foucault’s definition of neo-
liberalism to have more in common with the Marxist understanding of the term,
where liberalism is a technique for spreading capitalist relations across the globe,
than with the liberalism of political theory, global governance, or critical security
studies, Chandler, and Joseph are referring to.78
In reality, however, Foucault had a much more complicated relation to eco-
nomic liberalism than his followers (myself included) have been led to believe. In a
recent article Michael Behrent revealed that, towards the end of his life, Foucault,
like many other former French radicals post-1968, strategically endorsed economic
liberalism as a way to find ‘left-wing alternatives to ‘‘social statism’’ ’.79 Foucault
believed that economic liberalism, with its anti-humanism, utilitarianism, and suspi-
cion of concentrated power, could help the revolutionary Left make the jump from
ideology to governmentality, in other words, be less concerned with the origins and
authenticity of power than with how to use power to optimise human life.80 It is
not that Foucault was a fan of Reagan and Thatcher’s neoliberal reforms, only
that he recognised in the liberal art of government certain philosophical dispositions
which he thought the French Left, particularly the Socialist Party, would do well to
learn from if it wanted to advance a successful political programme.81
75 Barbara Cruikshank, The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects (Ithaca, NY:
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and Discipline in the New Millennium (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009).
77 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Hardt
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80 Ibid., pp. 564–5.
81 It is important here to make a clear distinction between neoliberalism, which Foucault could not
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Foucauldian scholarship has not yet considered these discoveries and one could
certainly wonder to what extent Foucault’s own political convictions still matter
after ‘the death of the author’. Foucauldians should take seriously, if not Foucault’s
personal politics, then at least his theoretical justifications for endorsing the method
of economic liberalism: Foucault saw his theories avenged in the triumph of eco-
nomic liberalism because it demonstrated that the paradigmatic mode of modern
power was not discipline, which is directed at individuals, but biopower, the purpose
of which is the management of populations.82 It further showed that if liberalism is
an effective model for improving the lives of the populace, it is because biopolitics is
a more productive, even benevolent form of power than usually assumed.83 Biopower
is less concerned with disallowing life than with bettering it, which in economic liber-
alism means synchronising human affairs with market relations. Beginning with the
eighteenth century, ‘[a]s a greater share of humans activities were given over to eco-
nomic relationships, human betterment began to eclipse the rule of law as the raison
d’etre of government.’84 In international affairs this prioritisation of prosperity over
security may seem imprudent, even to scholars sympathetic to Foucault, because
the international is not considered to have a notion of the good life. This has led
not only sceptics but also scholars working with Foucault to miss out on the heter-
ogeneity of bipower.
In International Relations biopower is most often read through Agamben, who
turns Foucault’s concept into something exclusively violent. Following Agamben,
biopower is said to generalise the ‘state of exception’ to the point where denigrating
life becomes the original activity of modern institutions85 and, indeed, a political
inevitability inscribed in the structure of liberal democratic politics.86 Particularly
critical security and border studies are eager to understand how biopolitics sub-
sumes human life to the strategic calculations of power in ways that transgress the
limits of legitimate rule into the terrain of emergency and exceptionality.87 The
82 Behrent, ‘Liberalism without Humanism’, p. 558.
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fields of study are more interested in how the liberal way of rule ‘kill[s] to make life
live’88 than in how it uses capitalist principles to give expression to life’s highest
ambitions. This reading of Foucault has come in handy for post-9/11 IR theory,
in particular with regards to the war on terror, exceptional incarceration and inter-
rogation tactics, and the rise of digital and biometric surveillance and securitisation
strategies. But it is a partial interpretation which refuses to distinguish between gov-
ernmental programmes that ‘protect life and [those that] authorize a holocaust’.89
What is worse, it has led to a hyperbolic image of liberalism which treats ‘the
securitizing logic of biopolitics [as a] globe-spanning regime of liberally imagined
life’.90 This promotes a somewhat hasty conclusion that exceptions and emergencies
are unavoidable faults of liberal democracy. Here, Selby and Chandler’s fear that
Foucauldian approaches in IR might ‘efface the state or sovereign as political sub-
jects, collapsing them into the rationalities of global power’ is not too far off the
mark.91 When we do not pay attention to the heterogeneity of biopower we end
up ‘reif [ying] exceptionalism as a structural inevitability’ and presenting the liberal
way of rule (and war) as an all-encompassing force that lies outside the bounds of
political decision-making.92
Yet the same is not true of all global governmentality studies. There is a growing
body of literature that promises to explore a dimension of biopolitics that is often
ignored in critical security approaches, namely, the ambition of modern power to
administer, regulate, and, ultimately, optimise the human body and the body politic
as a whole.93 As Mitchell Dean explains, if biopower
is concerned with matters of life and death, with birth and propagation, with health and
illness, both physical and mental and with the processes that sustain or retard the optimization
of the life of a population [, it] must then also concern the social, cultural, environmental,
economic and geographic conditions under which humans live, procreate, become ill,
maintain health or become healthy and die. From this perspective, bio-politics is concerned
with the family, with housing, living and working conditions, with what we call ‘lifestyle’,
with public health issues, patterns of migration, levels of economic growth and standards of
living. It is concerned with the bio-sphere in which humans dwell.94
Biopower, then, can also ‘exert a positive influence upon life’, not only to reduce it to
a worthless category. Particularly in the mundane and ‘uneventful’ facets of interna-
tional politics, such as finance, education, housing, production, consumption, urban
planning, architecture, and ecology we come to recognise the liberal ambition to pro-
duce and organise the space between birth and death according to market principles.
88 Dillon and Reid, The Liberal Way of War.
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This does not mean that the world is governed exclusively through market
principles or that the homo oeconomicus model of action is ubiquitous. To quote
Kiersey, ‘global neoliberal government . . . does not, and cannot, work on a truly
global population’.95 For now, at least, the liberal ideal seems to describe best the
condition of advanced industrial nations or select urban conglomerations and high-
value production sites across the globe. At the same time, however, this does not
undercut the hegemony of the liberal programme, which is a universal tendency
rather than a global actuality.96 Global governmentality manifests its force not
through the actual number of people or states it controls, but by acting as a
standard of reference against which all forms of life (individual, communal, political)
can be assessed according to modern conceptions of civilisation and order. Those
individuals who possess the skill, talent, market value, and entrepreneurial spirit to
respond opportunistically to the demands of capital will enjoy greater access to job
markets, housing options, residence permits, and cultural goods around the world.
Similarly, those states that can abide by to the dictums of good governance, fiscal
responsibility, and foreign security will receive better credit ratings, lending agree-
ments, and international support. Those who fail to conform will become second-
order citizens, confined to slums and ghettos, doomed to perform low-skilled and
tedious jobs, or perpetually developing states stuck in a tight spot between foreign
intervention and humanitarian assistance. As Agathangelou et al. aptly put it:
On the one hand, there are those for whom subjectivity, capital, and satiating pleasures
and rights are being forever promised. This occurs . . . at the expense of compliance with,
or perhaps distraction from, the larger structural underpinnings of social relations and
processes. On the other hand, there are the (non)subjects for whom the same promise has
not been issued, the abject(s) whose lives and deaths are completely nonspectacular within
the dominant imaginations.97
Global liberalism is not a global reality, as Joseph, Selby, and Chandler already
note, but a quite selective and stratified ‘field of possibilities’,98 which nonetheless
harbours a distinct universal ambition. If New Guinea or, for that matter, Arkansas
are excluded from or fail to conform to liberalism, that doesn’t mean that they exist
‘outside’ the liberal project. It is precisely because liberalism functions as a universal
measure of truth that we can understand the exclusion or failure of certain com-
munities and spaces.
We see here that the burgeoning body of literature on ‘neoliberal economic govern-
mentality’99 offers fresh approaches to global politics that are much more attuned to
the current realities of capitalism, globalisation, and empire than a purely state-centric
ontology or exclusively violent readings of the global. This interest in the benign
and benevolent aspects of biopower may have led Foucault to extend too much
support to liberalism. With global governmentality studies I should hope this focus
will translate into more grounded and responsible critiques of global capital.
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Doing IR research with Foucault
In this final section, I would like to enumerate three distinct advantages global
governmentality studies can offer to international studies: it can repopulate IR by
showing the importance of everyday practice and the centrality of subjectivity to
global power relations; promote the study of varied and contested manifestations
of ‘actually existing liberalism’; and encourage a more historically sensitive view
of global liberalism. Together these contributions have the power to advance a
more empirically grounded and politically engaged research agenda in Inter-
national Relations. They reflect my own views of what IR should be about and
whom it should be written for and do not exhaust the promise of either global
governmentality studies or IR scholarship. The list can be expanded depending on
research interests and political affinities.
First of all, global governmentality studies have the potential to break with
the discipline’s state-centric understanding of power and its radically dehumanised
picture of the international. If we take Foucault’s call seriously and follow power
relations like a detective would follow an elusive target, we inevitably end up at
subjectivity. Cutting off the king’s head was only the first of Foucault’s ambitions.
The next logical step was to ask ‘How is it possible that his headless body behaves
as if it indeed has a head?’100 To answer this question we need to recognise the
subjective condition ‘as the locus where the social link is forged’,101 the place
where power relations are either subscribed to or shaken off, where techniques
of individuation either converge or diverge with technologies of domination. This
preoccupation with the microphysics of power does not have to reduce politics to a
purely aesthetic field that refuses to engage with or make demands upon the state.
The subjective condition has multiple uses for IR: it can be used in the individualising
sense to look at how political subjects either solidify or reverse relations of power
through their everyday actions; in the totalising sense of populations that become
subjects of biopolitical interventions; in the technical sense of experts and epistemic
communities that render the world thinkable through their reports, research, and
policy recommendations; or in the historical sense as sedimented mentalities of know-
ing and doing that spill over into the present. In all of these contexts, capillary power
is able to trace the intimate relation between subjectivation and state-formation,
between the production free and autonomous individual and the spread of liberal
ideals.
The advantage of an approach centered on the subjective condition is that it can
‘strip political rule of its self-evident, normal or natural character, which is essential
for its operation’.102 In showing that global politics is not only constitutive of our
everyday lives, but also a product of it, governmentality approaches break with the
discipline’s state-centric understanding of power and its radically dehumanised
picture of the international. This represents both an ‘ontopolitical critique’103 of
rationalist models that anthropomorphise inanimate structures to give us a (static)
100 Thomas Lemke, ‘Foucault’s Hypothesis: From the Critique of the Juridico-Discursive Concept of
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picture of political action, and a corrective to post-structuralist theories which pro-
duce a purely discursive analysis of power. It has always been the discipline’s tradi-
tion to filter human life either through the voices and actions of official figures
or through the interests of state institutions.104 As Davies and Niemann explain,
IR theory mystifies and obscures the reality of global affairs ‘behind a veil, which
designates the practice of IR as the exclusive domain of experts, statesmen, diplomats
and, more recently, the chieftains of global business’.105 Even if critical IR made an
effort to include the voices of women, indigenous people and formerly colonised
subjects in the conversation, it has done so only to the extent that their testimonies
could illuminate the discipline’s already established areas of interest – war, domina-
tion, and subjection.106 Meanwhile, the political dimension of everyday life, in all
its mundane and humble facets, has remained largely within the scope of sociology,
anthropology, and cultural studies. Global governmentality, with its focus on how
power is dispersed, exercised, and experienced in everyday life,107 has the potential to
repopulate the discipline and return it to the promise contained in its title, namely,
the study of international social relations in all their richness and randomness.108
Second, global governmentality studies can help develop more empirically
grounded research of actually existing liberalism. Critics of governmentality studies
are right to demand greater specification on the conditions and structures that
allow the liberal ideal to become effective in some parts of the world and strained
in others. There is still a lot of translation work to be done before we can apply
the concept of governmentality to global politics in a way that does not ‘elide the
particulars of globalization’109 or present liberal power as a universal constant.
This is a particularly tricky task since globality does not have a concrete spatial
ontology (a postal address). It is not an all-encompassing, homogenous blanket that
stretches the entire world over, but rather a plethora of intersecting, heterogeneous,
and transient practices that cut across borders, both spatial and conceptual. Terms
such as ‘global’ or ‘international’ are ideal types that describe a site of intervention
or a problem to be solved as well as the sum of tools and strategies used to accom-
plish that intervention, ‘useful only to the extent that we keep in mind their nature
as virtual potentials’.110 The goal should not be to determine why certain states are
suitable to liberal rule while others lag behind, as Joseph demands.111 Instead,
global governmentality studies need to explore the strategies and technologies used
to reaffirm the liberal project as a universal, albeit spatially varied and contested,
standard of reference. In other words, the goal should be to study ‘actually existing
liberalism’.
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The term ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ was coined by Marxist geographers
Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore to ‘underscore the profound disjuncture between
orthodox neoliberal ideology and the complex, contested, and uneven geographies
of regulatory change that have emerged in and through projects of neoliberaliza-
tion’.112 Infused with a deep spatial sensibility reminiscent of the Marxist concept
of ‘uneven development’, the term is cognisant of the gap that exists between the
discourse of (neo-)liberalism and its spatially selective and diverse application. It is
also a call to arms for scholars from all disciplines to devote more attention to the
empirical, contextual, and local applications of global liberalism ‘on the ground’.
Answering this call could help Foucauldian scholars avoid treating governmentality
as a universal constant impervious to empirical investigation while, at the same
time, remain loyal to Foucault’s own view of method. As already mentioned above,
Foucault always insisted that we abandon a priori ontological categories and follow
the research question wherever it may take us by means of archival, archaeological
or genealogical methods. This type of non-positivist empiricism is ‘ ‘‘devoted only to
the subject,’’ and let[s] the analysis play out in surprising ways’113 regardless of
methodological purity or disciplinary loyalty.
Finally, Foucauldian approaches can offer a more comprehensive history of
global liberalism. Historically, the rise of the liberal doctrine has been inextricably
linked to the genealogy of Western modernity as it spread through technological
developments, trade, and economic networks, colonial and neo-colonial violences,
and other ‘apparatuses of capture’.114 The ambition to destroy or convert all forms
of life that exist outside the limits of capital or, conversely, to spread the necessary
types of subjects and social relations to support this ideal persists to this day. The
Bush Doctrine, for instance, merged neo-conservatism with liberal internationalism
to produce a so-called ‘Wilsonianism with teeth’ that would expand the dream
of liberal capital to spaces left ‘vacant’ after the demise of the Soviet Union.115
Similarly, the Washington Consensus, whether in the form of structural adjustment
plans or the more recent poverty reduction strategies, extends loans and foreign
assistance to developing nations only on the condition that these give up on their
indigenous forms of economy and sociality, and align themselves with neoliberal
market principles.
Foucault’s work and especially his discussion of neoliberalism have been criticised
for downplaying the historical conditions central to establishing the hegemony of
liberal capital to focus exclusively on the discursive processes of biopolitics within
Europe. But it seems to me that the most recent interventions in global governmen-
tality promise to rectify this point.116 By viewing liberalism as a gendered and racially
determined mechanism of power that cannot tolerate an ‘Other’ but must constantly
stretch into space as a technology of colonisation,117 governmentality approaches can
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‘make visible . . . what the ‘‘invisible hand’’ of free market and laissez-faire capitalism
hides from view’: the tyranny of expert and scientific knowledge, exploitative work
conditions, geographical displacements and neo-colonial warfare.118
A cautionary conclusion
In light of these generous promises it is ironic that Chandler, Joseph, and Selby
accuse global governmentality scholars of treating liberalism as an abstract rootless
force divorced from the realities of global politics. It seems to me that it is
precisely this later group that is trying to break the political quietism so dismal in
a discipline that claims to be interested in global politics by presenting the liberal
ideal as something more ambitious and hence more dangerous than just a set of
democratic principles and institutional designs.119 Aside from a brief interlude in
historical materialism120 and world-systems analysis,121 critiques of liberal capitalism
have remained comfortably on the margins of IR. With Joseph, for instance, we
cannot even be certain where he stands with regards to liberalism, his professed
Marxism notwithstanding. We cannot tell whether he sees it as a desirable goal
(his insistence on finding out in what places and under what conditions liberal govern-
mentality works seems to be indicating so) or whether he is purely agnostic about it
(which in and of itself is also a political position). If global governmentality studies
exaggerate the liberal character of world politics, as Joseph and Chandler claim, it
is only because they refer to a different type of liberalism – an economistic variant
that hangs on the cusp between Foucauldian theories of power and Marxian
critiques of capital. Adopting a more historically sensitive and empirically grounded
analysis of global liberalism will hopefully allow IR scholars to become politically
vocal in ways that can transcend the boundaries of their discipline and perhaps
even profession.
This being said, however, we should not fool ourselves into thinking that
Foucault can help us refurbish the disciplinary vestiges of International Relations.
The recurrent question, What can Foucault do or what has he already done to
IR?, posed by supporters and sceptics alike, represents two sides of the same coin.
It is, of course, the wrong coin.122 Sceptics are only prepared to welcome new
ideas and concepts into the disciplinary vocabulary as long as these can be made
to work within the already existing framework. Their aim is to assess the use-value
of Foucauldian approaches while leaving the disciplinary tradition intact. Supporters,
on the other hand, rush to point out, as I have done here, the myriad of ways in
which Foucault’s legacy can invigorate the study of International Relations: place
international political life in all its quotidian, connected, and conflicted aspects at
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the centre of our research agendas; encourage a hermeneutic understanding of
seemingly abstract and removed global affairs and put an end to the discipline’s his-
torical amnesia and political quietism. These promises are certainly hopeful but
they come with commensurate responsibilities. We cannot expect Foucault to offer
us a novel theory of the international when his primary goal would have been to
interrogate the ontological force of IR’s concepts and fields. As Andrew Neal ex-
plains this point lucidly:
[t]here is some irony in taking a historian who is not a historian and a political theorist who
is not a political theorist and trying to rethink him for International Relations (IR) or for
the study of relations of capital. It is not possible to do so and remain faithful to those
disciplines. To engage with the highly promiscuous thinker that is Foucault is to be
unfaithful. It is not possible to engage with Foucault while holding onto even the most
rudimentary of disciplinary commitments.123
I want to take this call further and argue that it is also not possible to work
with Foucault while remaining in the shadows of this thinker. Just like IR scholars
have a lot to learn from Foucault’s lessons on governmentality, state power and
liberalism, Foucauldians also have a responsibility to overcome a group identity
that would have surely made their patron saint uncomfortable. A first step in this
direction would be to recognise that global governmentality is not an approach
or school of thought – it lacks any model of theoretical explication or scientific
inquiry to merit this distinction. Rather, it is a style of analysis, a critical stance,
an ethos which Foucault referred to as a ‘critical ontology of ourselves’, ‘in which
the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of
the limits imposed on us and an experience with the possibility beyond them’.124
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